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41.
John Hillas Mathijs Jansen Jos Potters Dries Vermeulen 《International Journal of Game Theory》2004,32(3):371-377
Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction properties were not correct. They also provide a proof of the IIS property, a stronger version of both iterated dominance and forward induction, using the results of that paper. In this note we provide a direct proof of the IIS property.Received February 2002 相似文献
42.
In Leitmann (Ref. 1), a coordinate transformation method was introduced to obtain global solutions for free problems in the calculus of variations. This direct method was extended and broadened in Carlson (Ref. 2) and later in Leitmann (Ref. 3). The applicability of the original work of Leitmann (Ref. 1) was further developed in Dockner and Leitmann (Ref. 4) to include the class of open-loop dynamic games. In the present work, we improve the results of Ref. 4 in two directions. First, we enlarge the class of open-loop dynamic games to permit coupling among the dynamic equations via the states of the players; second, we incorporate the modifications given in Refs. 2 and 3. Our results greatly increase the applicability of this method. An example arising from the harvesting of a renewable resource is presented to illustrate the utility of our results. 相似文献
43.
Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results. 相似文献
44.
Two make-to-order firms, each modelled as a single-server queue, compete for a common stream of (potential) customers by setting their service capacities (rates) and service prices. Each customer maximizes her expected return by getting service from a firm or by balking. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the competition. 相似文献
45.
Two kinds of vertical cooperative advertising program are considered in a distribution channel constituted by a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer pays part of
the retailer’s advertising costs. In the first participation scheme, the manufacturer chooses his/her advertising participation
rate in the retailer’s advertising effort and then each player determines the advertising effort that maximizes his/her profit.
In the second scheme, the retailer chooses the manufacturer’s participation rate and then the manufacturer determines the
advertising efforts of both players with the objective of maximizing the manufacturer’s profit. Each participation scheme
corresponds to a special Stackelberg game: the manufacturer is the leader of the first, while the retailer is the leader of
the second. The Stackelberg equilibrium advertising efforts and participation rate in both games are provided. Then the equilibrium
strategies of the two players in the analyzed scenarios are compared with the Nash equilibrium in the competitive framework.
Finally, the conditions which suggest a special kind of agreement to a player are analyzed.
This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the University of Padua. 相似文献
46.
We consider time discrete systems which are described by a system of difference equations. The related discrete optimal control problems are introduced. Additionally, a gametheoretic extension is derived, which leads to general multicriteria decision problems. The characterization of their optimal behavior is studied. Given starting and final states define the decision process; applying dynamic programming techniques suitable optimal solutions can be gained. We generalize that approach to a special gametheoretic decision procedure on networks. We characterize Nash equilibria and present sufficient conditions for their existence. A constructive algorithm is derived. The sufficient conditions are exploited to get the algorithmic solution. Its complexity analysis is presented and at the end we conclude with an extension to the complementary case of Pareto optima.Dmitrii Lozovanu was Supported by BGP CRDF-MRDA MOM2-3049-CS-03. 相似文献
47.
We consider Nash equilibria in 2‐player random games and analyze a simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding an equilibrium. The algorithm is combinatorial and always finds a Nash equilibrium; on m × n payoff matrices, it runs in time O(m2nloglog n + n2mloglog m) with high probability. Our result follows from showing that a 2‐player random game has a Nash equilibrium with supports of size two with high probability, at least 1 − O(1/log n). Our main tool is a polytope formulation of equilibria. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Random Struct. Alg., 2007 相似文献
48.
van den Broek W. A. Engwerda J. C. Schumacher J. M. 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2003,119(3):565-595
Equilibria in dynamic games are formulated often under the assumption that the players have full knowledge of the dynamics to which they are subject. Here, we formulate equilibria in which players are looking for robustness and take model uncertainty explicitly into account in their decisions. Specifically, we consider feedback Nash equilibria in indefinite linear-quadratic differential games on an infinite time horizon. Model uncertainty is represented by a malevolent input which is subject to a cost penalty or to a direct bound. We derive conditions for the existence of robust equilibria in terms of solutions of sets of algebraic Riccati equations. 相似文献
49.
Systems that involve more than one decision maker are often optimized using the theory of games. In the traditional game theory, it is assumed that each player has a well-defined quantitative utility function over a set of the player decision space. Each player attempts to maximize/minimize his/her own expected utility and each is assumed to know the extensive game in full. At present, it cannot be claimed that the first assumption has been shown to be true in a wide variety of situations involving complex problems in economics, engineering, social and political sciences due to the difficulty inherent in defining an adequate utility function for each player in these types of problems. On the other hand, in many of such complex problems, each player has a heuristic knowledge of the desires of the other players and a heuristic knowledge of the control choices that they will make in order to meet their ends.In this paper, we utilize fuzzy set theory in order to incorporate the players' heuristic knowledge of decision making into the framework of conventional game theory or ordinal game theory. We define a new approach to N-person static fuzzy noncooperative games and develop a solution concept such as Nash for these types of games. We show that this general formulation of fuzzy noncooperative games can be applied to solve multidecision-making problems where no objective function is specified. The computational procedure is illustrated via application to a multiagent optimization problem dealing with the design and operation of future military operations. 相似文献
50.
Josep Maria Izquierdo 《TOP》2006,14(2):375-398
The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic
allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential
players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets. 相似文献